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   ddresing   the   widespread   poverty   problem   is  the
   single  most  important  policy  challenge  facing  the
   Philippines.  Not only is poverty high compared with
other countries in East Asia, but also its reduction is so slow
that the country has become the basket case in the region.
Proposals peddled to address the poverty problem are
plenty - and keep growing. At one end of the spectrum are
proposals contending that the root of the problem is simply
the lack of a respectable economic growth. Putting the economy
on a high-growth path is prescribed as all that is needed to lick
the poverty problem. At the other end are proposals asserting
that the poverty problem is nothing but a concrete manifesta-
tion of gross economic and social inequities.
Redistributing wealth and opportunities is viewed as the
key to winning the war on poverty. A variant of such proposals
holds that economic growth does not at all benefit the poor.
Focusing on growth rather than on redistributive reforms is
seen to exacerbate inequities, which could lead to further
erosion of peace and social stability. Between these extremes
are views that consider economic growth as a necessary
  This paper was presented  at the Whither the Philippines in the 21st Century?
Conference on the Philippines, organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore on 13-14 July 2006.
Acondition for poverty reduction and recognize that reform     mea-
sures have to be put in place to enhance the participation of the
poor in growth processes. Most advocates of poverty-   reduc-
tion ideas, including proponents of  the so-called            “pro-
poor growth,” belong to this mold, although not          necessarily
sharing common grounds on what, conceptually and operation-
ally, constitutes pro-poor growth processes.
How do these proposals/views stand in relation to evidence
and policy research? What are facts and what are fancies? Given
the country’s fiscal bind, what policy levers can be expected to
generate high returns in terms of poverty reduction?
This paper attempts to answer these questions. It does this
by examining the Philippine experience in poverty reduction
from an “international” perspective. The next two sections
characterize the nature, pattern, and proximate determinants
of poverty reduction during the past 20 years. The fourth
section examines the economy-population-poverty nexus,
specifically the quantitative significance of the country’s
continued rapid population growth to long-term income growth
and poverty reduction. Some concluding remarks are given in
the final section of the paper.
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     ustained increases in national income - that is, economic
           growth - are  required  for poverty reduction. Claims to
          the contrary are, however, periodically heard from  civil
society groups and nongovernment organizations (NGOs).
Recent development experience presents a clear evidence:   every
country that has chalked up significant achievements in
poverty reduction and human development has also done quite
well in securing long-term economic growth (see Deininger and
Squire 1998; Sachs 2005; Deaton 2005; Kraay 2006).
Indeed, viewed from a medium- to long-term perspective,
there is an almost one-for-one correspondence between growth
in the incomes of the poor and the country’s average income
growth. This correlation is not unexpected: economic  growth
is an essential condition for the generation of resources needed
to sustain investments in health, education, infrastructure, and
good governance (law enforcement, regulation), among
others.
While economic growth in most East and Southeast Asian
countries has been remarkably rapid during the past 25 years,
the same cannot be said for the Philippines (Table 1). The
country’s economic growth has been quite anemic, barely
exceeding the population growth rate, which has continued to
expand rapidly at 2.3 percent a year for most of the past two
decades.  Economic growth has quickened in the first half of
Sthe present decade, but questions on the sustainability of this
growth linger. Even at the present pace, it can hardly be argued
that the Philippines has come close to the growth trajectories
of its neighbors. It is thus not surprising that serious students
of Philippine development contend that shifting the economy
to a higher growth path – and keeping it there for the long
term – should be first and foremost on the development agenda.
The country’s dismal economic record shows up even more
vividly in the poverty front. Poverty reduction in the
Philippines lagged far behind those of its East Asian
neighbors, particularly Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and China
(Figure 1). Both China and Vietnam started with higher levels
of poverty incidence than did the Philippines during the early
1980s, but their absolute poverty soon dwindled and became
much lower than the Philippines’ during the early 2000s. Both
Malaysia and Thailand also had virtually eliminated absolute
poverty in the past 20 years. Interestingly, while the average
income in the Philippines in the mid-2000s (PPP $4,381) was
much higher than in Vietnam (PPP $2,683) and Indonesia
* Data start in 1985
  Sources:  World Development Indicators  2006;  ADB Outlook 2006
Table 1. Levels and growth rates of GDP per capita, 1980-2005.
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Countries
1980 2005 1980-2005 2000-2005
Philippines 4,160 4,381 0.63 2.5
Indonesia 1,462 3,402 3.7 3.25
Malaysia 4,047 9,687 3.65 3
Thailand 2,488 7,862 4.59 4.13
Korea, Rep. 4,557 18,316 5.53 4.56
Vietnam* na 2,683 4.87 6.1
China 762 5,643 8.49 8.56
Annual growth rate (%)
GDP per capita 
(PPP $, in 2000 prices)2   PPP is the preferred measure when comparing incomes of different countries.
It takes into account differences in the prices of goods and services and is
used by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank.
(PPP $3,402), its absolute poverty was actually much higher
than in either of the latter countries.2
Clearly, the unenviable performance of the Philippines in
poverty reduction has to do largely with its inability to achieve
- and sustain - an income growth substantially higher than its
population growth. But is this all that can be said about the
poverty problem in the Philippines?
The poor performance of the Philippines in economic
growth and poverty reduction has often been attributed in part









Early 1990s Late 1990s Early 2000s
%
China Viet Nam Indonesia Philippines
Note: Figures pertain to proportion of population with income per capita below US$1 a day (in PPP).   
Sources of data: World Bank and ESCAP. 
Figure 1.  Poverty reduction in East Asia.
Note:  Figures pertain to proportion of population with income per capita
below US$ 1 a day (in PPP).
Sources of data:  World Bank and ESCAP.
         The Growth-Poverty Nexus                 5to the relatively large variation in access to infrastructure and
social services across regions and island groups. A widely held
view, for example, is that development efforts have favored
Luzon and discriminated against the Visayas and (especially)
Mindanao. Proponents of this view say that this development
pattern has led to substantial regional differences in access to
economic opportunities, in rates of poverty reduction, and in
the incidence of armed conflict. For instance, the Philippine
Human Development Report 2005 shows that measures of
deprivation – such as disparities in access to reliable water
supply, electricity, and especially education – predict well the
occurrence of armed encounters (HDN 2005).
Table 2 shows the patterns of poverty across regions of
the Philippines from 1988 to 2003, as well as the contribution
of each region to national poverty. As one would expect given
the regions’ very diverse growth records (see the last column),
considerable variations occured across regions. However, Metro
Manila consistently had the lowest poverty while Bicol,
Western Mindanao, and the Visayas, the highest.
In 2003, poverty incidence was roughly 10 times higher in
Bicol and Western Mindanao than in Metro Manila. Some
significant re-rankings also occurred, such as the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) becoming the poorest
region in 2003 when it was the third least poor region (out of
16 regions) in 1988. Even more significant is the differential
evolution of poverty over time. In two regions, Western
Mindanao and ARMM, poverty - both in incidence and depth -
was higher in 2003 than in 1988. This decline also shows up in
measures reflecting human development deprivation, particu-
larly in the areas of health and education (HDN 2005).
Towards the close of the 1990s, these two regions, particularly
ARMM, were at the center of violent confrontations between
the military and armed dissidents.
6             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
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         The Growth-Poverty Nexus                 7The long-term relationship between Philippine poverty and
income growth is even more evident for data on the country’s
77 provinces. This is shown in Figure 2, which plots the change
in poverty incidence between 1985 and 2003 and the
corresponding percent change in real family income per capita,
adjusted for provincial cost-of-living differences.3 Clearly, as
noted in the cross-country data above, the pace of poverty
reduction at the provincial level is closely linked to local
economic performance. However, there are significant depar-
tures from the fitted line (i.e., provinces not conforming to the
“average pattern”), suggesting that factors other than the rate
of local economic growth are influencing the evolution of
poverty.
In another paper, using  provincial data covering the
country’s 77 provinces between the years 1988 and 2003,
Balisacan (2006) traced the quantitative significance of the
channels by which income growth, together with a host of other
factors, influenced poverty reduction. In his model, these other
factors affect the speed of poverty reduction directly by
changing the distribution of a given economic pie, or indirectly
by expanding the economic pie for each person in society (i.e.,
by way of economic growth). These factors can be grouped
into two types:
a.  Initial economic and institutional conditions (in or around 1988) -  initial
mean provincial per capita income; initial distribution of per
capita income; initial human capital stock; political ‘dynasty’
3 Poverty estimates are those used in Balisacan (2006) and Balisacan and Fuwa
(2004). These are not comparable with official data released by the National
Statistical Coordination Board. As shown in Balisacan (2003b), the official
estimates are not quite an accurate guide to ascertaining changes in absolute
poverty over time or across regions—or provinces, or between rural and
urban areas—of the country
8             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
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Figure 2.  Income growth and poverty reduction, Philippine
     provinces, 1985- 2003.
(as proxy for political competitiveness); and ethno-linguistic
fragmentation; and
b.  Time-varying policy variables (difference during 1988 - 2003) - simple
adult literacy rate; agricultural terms of trade (as proxy for
economic incentives); access to infrastructure (represented by
electricity and good-quality road); and Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) implementation.
The regression results reveal cracks in poverty reduction
efforts. The policy variables and the variables representing
initial conditions, except those pertaining to human capital and
infrastructure, are found to mainly exert an indirect effect on
poverty reduction through their effect on overall income
growth.
         The Growth-Poverty Nexus                 9For infrastructure, particularly transport, and initial human
capital, both direct and indirect effects are operative and, taken
together, have positive impact on the pace of poverty reduc-
tion. Particularly remarkable is the lack of direct response of
poverty to CARP. Considering that the agrarian reform
program is touted as an equity tool, this result is not only
surprising but also inconsistent with earlier findings.4 This is
not to say that CARP has no effect on the poor. It has, but its
effect is mainly through the income growth channel. Taken
together, the regression results show very limited direct effects
of recent policies and institutions on the speed of poverty
reduction; their effects get transmitted to poverty reduction
indirectly, mainly through overall income growth.
Another interesting observation from the above study, as
well as other studies using the same provincial data (e.g.,
Balisacan and Fuwa 2004), concerns the extent by which
poverty responds to overall income, after taking into account
the influences of other factors noted above. This response can
be aptly summarized by what is referred to as “growth
elasticity” of poverty reduction. This elasticity clusters around
1.3 to 1.65: a 1 percent increase in the income growth rate
increases the poverty reduction rate by roughly 1.3 to 1.6
percent.  Significantly,  these estimates are much lower than
those reported for other developing countries. For example,
using parameter estimates of inequality distribution for each
country, Cline (2004) obtained growth elasticities of 2.9 for
4 See Balisacan (2003) and Deininger and Squire (1998). Balisacan and Fuwa
(2004) also found that CARP had a positive direct effect on poverty reduction
rate, although the estimate was marginally significant only. It is probably
the case that the implementation of the program evolved quite differently
in recent years. There is evidence, for example, that CARP is implemented
more vigorously in areas with high growth potentials (Edillon and Velarde
2004).
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obtained a growth elasticity of 2.5 for 47 developing countries,
based on a bivariate regression of the proportionate changes in
their poverty rates and mean incomes. A similar bivariate
regression of the data employed by Balisacan (2006) gives an
elasticity of 1.5. Hence, by all these indications, the growth
elasticity in the Philippines is quite low by international
standards.
Clearly, the very low income growth achieved in recent years
is a key factor in the country’s sluggish rate of poverty
reduction. Still, even this modest level of income growth could
have delivered more poverty reduction than what had been ac-
tually realized if the growth elasticity in the Philippines had
come close to those in neighboring countries. Why is this so?
What conditions need to change, and what policy responses
need to evolve, to make poverty reduction more responsive to
economic growth? Put differently, what does it take to improve
the quality of growth?
5 Cline’s estimate for the Philippines was 2.2. While higher than the other
estimates quoted here, it is still low by Asian standards.
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  running  between  agricultural  and  rural development
  and poverty reduction.  Investments in social services,
especially in basic health and education, particularly in rural
areas, have also high payoffs in terms of poverty reduction.
Serious students of Philippine economic development also call
attention to the  need to address the country’s rapid population
growth, since there is a strong link between economic
performance, on the one hand, and economic growth and
poverty reduction, on the other. These channels to poverty
reduction are elaborated below.
As in most of Asia’s developing countries, poverty in the
Philippines is a largely rural phenomenon. Two of every three
poor persons in the country are located in rural areas and are
dependent predominantly on agricultural employment and
incomes (Balisacan 2003a).  Even poverty in urban areas is
largely a consequence of low productivity and slow expansion
of  employment opportunities in rural areas; that is, extreme
deprivation  in rural areas induces rural-urban migration.
Recent development experience demonstrates that rural
development fueled by rapid productivity growth in the
agricultural sector holds the key to sustained poverty reduction
(Rosegrant and Hazell 1999; Timmer 2005).  In developing
countries where agricultural growth was rapid, sustained, and
Sharpening  the response of
poverty to local economic growth
Bbroadly based, growth of farm incomes was sustained despite
farm price declines in world markets, domestic food prices
remained low, rural employment diversification was enhanced,
and, consequently, poverty reduction was robust.
Prior to the country’s accession to the WTO in 1995, the
performance of the agriculture sector was quite poor
compared with those in other Asian countries. During the
period 1980-94, Philippine agriculture grew at a measly 1.5
percent a year, the lowest among the major developing Asian
countries (Table 3). The growth was even less than the rate of
population growth then (averaging about 2.4 percent a year).
The mediocre growth mirrored the poor performance of the
overall economy.
Table 3.  Average agriculture growth (%), 1965-2002.
Note: Data for Malaysia start only in 1971, Nepal in
1966, Vietnam in 1986.
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
2005.
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Vietnam 3.24 4.25In the period following the country’s accession to the WTO,
the country’s agricultural growth improved to 2.4 percent a year,
though this still paled in comparison with the averages for China
(3.5%) and Vietnam (4.2%), two of the most aggressive
globalizers in the Asian region. The figure though is
surprisingly higher than the averages for Malaysia and
Indonesia and comparable with Thailand’s. Note, however, that
in both Malaysia and Thailand, the relative importance of
agriculture in national income had declined substantially
during the past two decades of rapid economic growth, while
in Indonesia, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 left a deep
puncture on the economy and the agriculture sector.
What Table 3 suggests is that, contrary to popular claims,
especially by many nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and
influence peddlers in government, the country’s accession to
the WTO could not be a compelling reason for the compara-
tively poor performance of agriculture in recent years. All the
other major developing countries in the Asian region operated
in a similar global trading environment as the Philippines but
had significantly higher agriculture and overall economic growth
rates than those achieved by the Philippines.
Production growth could come from either expansion of
the cultivated area or from increases in output per unit area.
The former is no longer a practical option for the Philippines
mainly due to conversion of land to non-agricultural purposes.
Hence, output growth would have to come from productivity
growth through sustained technological improvements.
A comprehensive measure of productivity growth is total
factor productivity (TFP) growth. This measure represents
output growth net of the growth in all production inputs. It is
thus an appropriate indicator of efficiency (and competitive-
ness) improvement. The available TFP data for the 1970s
  Sharpening the Response of Poverty                        15
to Local Economic Growthsuggest that the Philippines at that time fared comparably with
Thailand and Indonesia (Table 4). However, the succeeding two
decades saw productivity stagnating in the Philippines (0.2% a
year) but continuing to grow in Thailand (1.0% a year) and
Indonesia (1.5% a year). China, on the other hand, enjoyed a
very high TFP growth rate of 4.7 percent per year during this
period, though the figures pertain to grains only. At this rate, it
is not surprising that China increasingly has become a major
producer of cheap agricultural commodities in the world com-
modity markets. Also, at this rate, China could well afford to
reduce tariff protection for its farmers even before it acceded
to the WTO, without reducing farmers’ net incomes (FAO
2006a).
Table 4. Growth of total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture
  (% per year).
*1979-95 for China (covering rice, wheat, and corn only), 1981-95 for Thailand,
   1981-98 for Indonesia, 1980-98 for the Philippines, and 1985-2000 for Vietnam
   (rice only).
   Source: Mundlak et al. (2004) for Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines; Jin et al.
   (2002) for China; ICARD (2004), cited in FAO (2006b), for Vietnam.
Low productivity growth in agriculture, where the bulk of
the poor are located and on which they depend for incomes
and livelihood, mirrors what would be expected on the evolu-
tion of farm incomes, household incomes in general, and
poverty. As recent experiences in Asia and elsewhere suggest,
productivity growth in agriculture exerts a strong direct and
indirect influence on poverty and food insecurity (Rosegrant
and Hazell 2000; Timmer 2005; Balisacan and Fuwa 2006b).
16             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
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Period China Thailand Indonesia Vietnam Philippines
1970-1980 na 1.3 1.6 na 1
1980-2000* 4.7 1 1.5 2 0.1
All Period 1.2 1.5 0.2More importantly, increases in agricultural productivity and
farm incomes stimulate the growth of non-farm activities and,
hence, employment opportunities. Put differently, while
agricultural growth directly reduces rural poverty and food
insecurity, the indirect effects on the rural non-farm economy,
as well as urban economy, through demand and supply
linkages can be even more important sources of food security
and rural poverty reduction in the long run.
Drawing on the Asian experience, the response of rural
non-farm areas (as well as urban areas) and, hence, of rural
poverty to agricultural growth, including export or urban
demand expansion, requires a number of things. These include
investments in rural infrastructure and human capital, removal
of public-spending biases favoring large farmers and agri-
business enterprises, promotion of small-scale enterprises,
improved access to land and technology, and macroeconomic
and political stability. The Philippine record in virtually all these
things is far inferior to those of its East Asian neighbors.
Specifically, the country has neglected to invest in what recent
economic history has shown as “deep determinants” of rural
growth and poverty reduction: market-friendly institutions,
rural infrastructure, and health and education.6
Beside fostering agricultural and rural development, what
else can government do to maximize returns - in terms of
poverty reduction - to government expenditures? Given the
fiscal bind, what menu of government spending would yield
high returns for the poor? Put differently, what programs would
have comparatively high chances of benefiting the poor and
therefore should receive comparatively more support in terms
of government outlay? Table 5 provides such a guide to
6 See David (2003) for an analysis of the factors influencing the performance
of Philippine agriculture.
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to Local Economic Growthnational government spending. The list is by no means
exhaustive, but it includes areas that have been extensively
demonstrated - both in the country and elsewhere - as effective
vehicles for directly influencing the welfare of the poor, while
keeping the fiscal burden of poverty reduction programs to
manageable levels by reducing leakages of the benefits of such
programs to the unintended (non-poor) groups.
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    failure  to achieve  a  demographic  transition similar
    to what its  Southeast  and   East  Asian  neighbors
went through during the past three decades.7 In all these
countries, including the Philippines, mortality rates declined
almost at broadly similar rates, but fertility rates declined much
more slowly in the Philippines than in its neighbors.
Consequently, while population growth rates declined
substantially to below  2 percent a year in such countries as
Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam, the rate hardly changed at a
high level of 2.3 a year in the Philippines. The working-age
population of East  Asian  countries was 57 percent in 1965
and 65 percent in 1990, increasing four times compared with
the number of dependents. In contrast, the Philippines had a
working-age population of below 60 percent, with 52  percent
in 1980, 55 percent in 1990, 56 percent in 1995 and 58 percent
in 2000.
The other big but neglected
problem - rapid population growth
O
7 Demographic transition is a change from a situation of high fertility and high
mortality to one of low fertility and low mortality. This change results in
sizable changes in the age distribution of the population. The change can
create the “demographic dividend,” i.e., the increases in per capita income
as the bulge in the age pyramid moves, over time, from young people (infants
and children) to prime age for productive work and savings.Compelling evidence demonstrates that demographic
dividend has contributed immensely to the rapid economic
growth in the so-called “East Asian miracle” countries during
the past three decades (World Bank 1993; Bloom et al. 1999;
McNicoll 2006). Bloom et al., in particular, estimated this
contribution to be roughly one-third of the observed growth
rates of per capita GDP.
Table 5. Indicative areas for national government spending on a
  poverty program.
Areas to spend more Areas to spend less
1. Basic education, especially teaching 
materials; technical education and skills 
development esp. in rural areas.
Tertiary education: cost-recovery (but 
with scholarship for the poor)
2. Basic health and family planning 
services
Tertiary health care: Impost cost-recovery
3. Rural infrastructure, especially 
transport & power (but w/ coordination)
Public works equipment program (except 
for short-term disaster relief)
4. Targeted supplementary feeding 
programs and food stamps
General food price subsidies 
5. R&D and small-scale irrigation systems Post-harvest facilities (private goods)
6. Capacity building for LGUs & 
microfinance providers
Livelihood programs (except for short-
term disaster relief)
7. Impact monitoring & evaluation
In the Philippines, the population issue remains highly
contentious. At the center of the debate is whether population
growth has any bearing on economic development and poverty
reduction. At one extreme is the Catholic Church’s strong
opposition to any reference to population growth as a
contributory factor to the country’s transformation to a basket
case. Philippine administrations, particularly that of President
Arroyo, have been very sensitive to the Church’s stand on the
issue, especially concerning population policy and population
20             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
      Facts, Fancies, and Policiesprograms. Surprisingly, despite its obvious importance in this
debate, empirical work examining the quantitative significance
of the economy-population-poverty dynamics in the Philippines
is quite scarce.Until lately, what exactly the country has missed
in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction by way of
demographic dividend has not been known.
In a recent study, Balisacan et al. (2006) attempted to fill
this gap by using a combination of estimation techniques and
data to “discover” the relationship between population growth
and the demographic transition on economic growth and
poverty reduction. They used data consisting of 80 developing
and developed countries and covering 25 years. Their focus was
on long-run effects, thus the reason for their using a relatively
large time series data. To the extent allowed by available data,
their estimation has controlled for the influences of factors other
than population growth, including institutions, trade regimes,
and income inequality. Some highlights of their findings are:
•  Total population growth rate has a negative and
significant impact on economic growth.
•  Workers’ population growth has a positive and
significant impact on economic growth.
•  Heath status of the population has a positive and
significant impact on economic growth.
•  Openness to trade has a positive and significant impact
on economic growth.
•  Quality of public institutions has a positive and
significant impact on economic growth.
Of particular interest here is the result of the comparison
between Thailand and the Philippines. These two countries are
interesting cases because they have a lot of things in common:
land area, economic structure, natural resources, and goods
The Other Big But Neglected Problem -     21
Rapid  Population  Growthtraded in the international market. In the mid-1970s, the two
countries had roughly the same population: 43 million in the
Philippines growing at about 2.6 percent that year and 41
million in Thailand growing at about 2.7 percent.
The Philippines was ahead in terms of average income: per
capita GDP in the Philippines was US$ 1,502 (in PPP), about
twice the per capita GDP of Thailand at US $805 (in PPP).8
During the period 1975–2000, the Philippines’ GDP grew at
an average of 4.1 percent only, doubling income after 17 years.
Thailand’s GDP, on the other hand, grew at an amazing
average rate of 8.8 percent for the same period (more than
twice the growth rate of the Philippines), doubling income   after
only 8 years. In 2000, per capita GDP in the Philippines was
US$ 3,971 (in PPP) – about 2.6 times the initial GDP per capita
in 1975. Thailand’s 2000 per capita GDP was US$ 6,402 - 8
times its 1975 per capita GDP.
While Thailand and the Philippines had also roughly similar
population growth rates in 1975, as Figure 3 shows, the former
was able to manage its population growth during the 25-year
period, growing annually at an average of 1.6 percent only. The
Philippines, however, maintained its relatively high population
growth rate throughout the period, growing at an average of
2.4 percent per year in the 1990s. Hence the total population
of the Philippines ballooned to about 76 million in year 2000
while Thailand’s was about 61 million only.
To what extent does the difference in population dynamics
between the two countries account for the stark difference in
their economic performance? Table 6 provides the results of a
“growth accounting” required to identify this contribution. The
first column in the table identifies the relevant variable. The
22             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
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8 Data are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.9 The population factor comes out as the second most important component
-after initial income - accounting for the income growth difference between
the two countries.
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Thailand
Philippines
Sources: National Statistics Office census for various years (Philippines);  International Data Base (Thailand).  Figure 3.  Population growth:  Philippines vs. Thailand
    (% per year).
Sources: National Statistics Office census for various years (Philippines); International
Data Base (Thailand).
second column corresponds to the actual values of the
variables for the Philippines, and the third column reports the
values for Thailand. The last column gives the additional growth
rate that the Philippines would have enjoyed if it had Thailand’s
values (column 3) rather than its own values (column 2). Thus,
the last column provides the estimate of the foregone economic
growth. Thus, the last column provides the estimate of the
foregone economic growth. The results show that differences in
the population growth rates between the two countries account
for about 0.77 percentage point of foregone growth for the
Philippines.9 This figure (Figure 4) implies that had the
Philippines followed Thailand population growth path during
the period 1975 to 2000, the country’s growth in the average
income  per person would have been 0.77 percentage point
higher every year.
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Rapid  Population  GrowthTable 6.  Why the Philippines grew so slow.
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Figure 4.  Per capita income in the Philippines had the
    country followed Thailand’s population dynamics.
Combining this result with those of previous studies
estimating the effects of growth in the income per person on
poverty reduction, Balisacan et al. also showed that poverty
incidence in 2000, had the Philippines followed Thailand’s popu-
lation growth, would have been lower by 5.3 percentage points.
Put differently, given that the population in 2000 was 76.5
million, about 4.05 million would have escaped poverty, if only
the Philippines followed the population growth dynamics of
Thailand during the period 1976-2000.
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Variable Philippines Thailand  Foregone   
Growth
Population growth (%) 0.77
Total 2.36 1.58
Workers  2.85 2.53
Other included variables* (%) 2.07
Total growth differential accounted by 
model ( %) 2.84
Actual GDP per capita growth rate, 
average of 1975-2000 ( %) 4.1 8.84 4.74Concluding Remarks
   he persistence of poverty in the the Philippines has
    to do largely with its inability to achieve - and sustain -
    income growth substantially higher than its population
growth. Contrary to popular claims, economic growth has been
beneficial to the poor - as well as the nonpoor.
However, while economic growth is good for the poor, it is
not good enough. The response of poverty reduction to
income growth in the Philippines has been quite muted by
international standards, especially in comparison with the
country’s neighbors. Hence, the Philippines’s unenviable record
in poverty reduction in recent years is the outcome not only of
its comparatively low per capita GDP growth rate but also of
its weakness in transforming any rate of income growth into
poverty reduction. The quality of economic growth has to be
improved to enhance the benefits of growth to the poor.
Even given the fiscal bind, there are wide avenues for
improving the response of poverty to overall income growth.
Evidence suggests, for example, a strong connection running
between agricultural and rural development and poverty
reduction. Investments in social services, such as in basic health
and education especially in rural areas, have also high payoffs
in terms of poverty reduction. Serious students of Philippine
economic development also call attention to the  need to
address the country’s rapid population growth, since there is a
Tstrong link between economic performance, on the one hand,
and economic growth and poverty reduction, on the other.
The very high spatial diversity in the Philippines is quite
remarkable. Some pockets of the country have human
development outcomes comparable with those found in more
economically advanced countries; for example, Metro Manila’s
Human Development Index (HDI) for 2003 is comparable with
that of Thailand, and the province of Rizal’s  with Ukraine’s.
However, many other areas have outcomes comparable with
those found in the poorest countries of the world; for example,
the ARMM provinces have HDI scores comparable with those
of Sudan, Ghana, and Myanmar. In recent years some regions
have done quite well in attaining high per capita income growth
and reducing poverty, but others - disturbingly - have
experienced falls in their average per capita income and an
increase in poverty. Viewed from an international perspective,
such disparities could breed regional unrest, armed conflicts,
and political upheavals, thereby undermining the progress in
securing sustained economic growth and national development.
The good news is that the growth processes in recent years
have allowed the lagging regions to catch up with the leading
ones. Balisacan (2006) shows that there is a tendency for
convergence of provincial mean incomes over the long term.
Infrastructure, human capital, economic climate, trade regime,
and agricultural relations are the key drivers of provincial
income growth. Improvements in access to roads, electricity,
and health and schooling have positive effects on provincial
income growth rates. Policy regimes that do not unduly reduce
the profitability of agriculture relative to non-agriculture also
help boost provincial income growth. Likewise, improved
access to productive assets and technology by way of CARP is
an important source of provincial income growth.
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levers that have often been identified as tools for achieving
equity objectives – human capital and asset reform through
CARP – have no discernible direct  effects on poverty reduc-
tion; their effects are felt mostly indirectly  through the income
growth process. In other words, even programs supposedly
targeted at poverty such as CARP have actually been neutral
from an    income distribution viewpoint! One interpretation
of this result is that the implementation of such programs has
actually been poorly targeted. There is evidence to support this
proposition as regards many of the country’s direct anti-
poverty programs such as food subsidies, credit subsidies,
irrigation and seed subsidies, and housing and schooling
subsidies.
Even more disturbing is the government’s posture with
respect to the rapidly growing population. Policies and
programs concerning population have remained captive to the
Catholic Church’s stand on the issue. The consequence of such
posture on economic growth and poverty reduction has been
staggering: it has contributed to the country’s transformation
to being Southeast Asia’s basket case. This stance has to change,
if only to improve the country’s chances of moving the economy
to a higher growth path and winning the war against poverty.
    Concluding Remarks     2728             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
      Facts, Fancies, and Policies
T T T T Th h h h he pe e pe e pe e pe e per r r r rsis sis sis sis sist t t t te e e e en n n n nce o ce o ce o ce o ce of po f po f po f po f pov v v v ve e e e ert rt rt rt rty in t y in t y in t y in t y in th h h h he Philip e Philip e Philip e Philip e Philipp p p p pin in in in ine e e e es s s s s
h h h h ha a a a as t s t s t s t s to d o d o d o d o do l o l o l o l o lar ar ar ar arg g g g ge e e e el ll l ly w y w y w y w y wit it it it ith its in h its in h its in h its in h its ina a a a ab b b b bilit ilit ilit ilit ility t y t y t y t y to a o a o a o a o ac c c c chi hi hi hi hie e e e ev v v v ve - e - e - e - e -
an an an an and su d su d su d su d sus s s s st t t t tain - in ain - in ain - in ain - in ain - inco co co co come gr me gr me gr me gr me gro o o o owt wt wt wt wth su h su h su h su h sub b b b bs s s s st t t t tan an an an anti ti ti ti tiall all all all ally y y y y
hi hi hi hi high gh gh gh ghe e e e er t r t r t r t r th h h h han its po an its po an its po an its po an its pop p p p pul ul ul ul ula a a a ati ti ti ti tio o o o on gr n gr n gr n gr n gro o o o owt wt wt wt wth h h h h. . . . .Balisacan, A.M. (2003a), “Poverty and Inequality,” in A.M.
Balisacan and H. Hill (eds.), The Philippine Economy:
Development, Policies, and Challenges, Oxford University
Press, New York.
Balisacan, A.M. (2003b), “Poverty Comparison in the
Philippines: Is What We Know about the Poor Robust?”
in C. Edmonds (ed.), Reducing Poverty in Asia: Emerging
Issues in Growth, Targeting, and Measurement, Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham, UK.
Balisacan, A.M. (2006), “Local Growth and Poverty
Reduction,” in Dynamics of  Regional Development: The
Philippines in East Asia, Edward Elgar, United Kingdom,
forthcoming.
Balisacan, A.M. and E. Pernia (2002), “The Rural Road to
Poverty Reduction: Some Lessons from the Philippine
Experience,” Journal of  Asian and African Studies, 37(2):
147-167.
Balisacan, A.M. and N. Fuwa (2004), “Going beyond Cross-
country Averages: Growth, Inequality and Poverty
Reduction in the Philippines”, World Development, 32(11):
1,891–907.
References:Balisacan, A. and N. Fuwa (2006a), “Changes in Spatial
Income Inequality in the Philippines: An Exploratory
Analysis,” in R. Kanbur, T. Venables, and G. Wan (eds.),
Spatial Disparities in Human Development: Perspectives from
Asia, United Nations University Press, Tokyo.
Balisacan, A.M. and N. Fuwa (2006b), “Poverty and
Vulnerability,” in Balisacan, A.M. and N. Fuwa (eds.),
Agricultural and Rural Development in Asia: Ideas, Paradigms,
and Policies since the 1970s, Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, Singapore, and SEARCA, Philippines, forthcoming.
Balisacan, A.M., D. Mapa, C. Tubianosa, and Associates
(2006c), The Population-Economy-Poverty Links in the
Philippines: A Quantitative Assessment, University of the
Philippines Press, Quezon City, forthcoming.
Bloom, D.E., D. Canning and P.N. Malaney (1999),
“Demographic Change and Economic Growth in Asia.”
CID Working Paper.
Cline, W.R. (2004), “Technical Correction,” in Trade Policy and
Global Poverty, Institute of International Economics,
Washington DC.
David, C.C. (2003), “Agriculture,” in A.M. Balisacan and H.
Hill (eds.), The Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and
Challenges, Oxford University Press, New York.
Deaton, A. (2005), “Measuring Poverty in a Growing World
(or Measuring Growth in a Poor World),” Review of
Economics and Statistics, 87: 1–19.
30             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
      Facts, Fancies, and PoliciesDeininger, K. and L. Squire (1998), “New ways of looking at
old issues: Inequality and growth,’ Journal of  Development
Economics, 57: 259–87.
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2002), “Growth is Good for the
Poor,” Journal of  Economic Growth, 7: 195–225.
Edillon, R. and R. Velarde (2004), “ARC Strategy—Paving
the Way from Agrarian Reform to Poverty Reduction:
Assessing the Impact of the ARC Strategy on Poverty
Using Census, National Housing Surveys, and ALDA,”
Asia Pacific Policy Center, Quezon City.
FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] (2006a), Rapid
Growth of  Selected Asian Countries—Lessons and Implications
for Agriculture and Food Security: China and India, Policy
Assistance Series 1/2, FAO Regional Office for Asia and
the Pacific, Bangkok.
FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] (2006b), Rapid
Growth of  Selected Asian Countries—Lessons and Implications
for Agriculture and Food Security: Republic of  Korea, Thailand
and Viet Nam, Policy Assistance Series 1/3, FAO
Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok.
HDN [Human Development Network] (2005), Philippine
Human Development Report 2005, Quezon City.
Kraay, A (2006), “When is growth pro-poor? Evidence from
a panel of countries,” Journal of  Development Economics, 80:
198-227.
          References                31McNicoll, G. (2006), “Policy Lessons of the East Asian
Demographic Transition,” Population and Development Review,
32: 1-25.
Mundlak, Y., D.F. Larson, and R. Butzer (2004), “Determinants
of Agricultural Growth in Thailand, Indonesia, and the
Philippines,” T. Akiyama and D.F. Larson (eds.), Rural
Development and Agricultural Growth in Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand, Asia Pacific Press, Canberra.
Ravallion, M. (2001), “Growth, Inequality, and Poverty:
Looking beyond Averages,” World Development, 29: 1803-15.
Rosegrant, M. and P.B.R. Hazell (1999), Transforming the Rural
Asian Economy: The Unfinished Revolution, Oxford University
Press, Hong Kong.
Sachs, J. (2005), The End of  Poverty: How We Can Make It Happen
in Our Lifetime, Penguin Books, London.
Timmer, C.P. (2005), “Agriculture and Pro-Poor Growth: An
Asian Perspective”, Working Paper Number 62, Center for
Global Development, Washington, DC.
World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and
Public Policy, Oxford University Press for the World Bank,
New York.
32             Why Does Poverty Persist in the Philippines:
      Facts, Fancies, and PoliciesT T T T Th h h h he q e q e q e q e qu u u u ualit alit alit alit ality o y o y o y o y of eco f eco f eco f eco f econ n n n no o o o omi mi mi mi mic gr c gr c gr c gr c gro o o o owt wt wt wt wth h h h h
h h h h ha a a a as t s t s t s t s to be im o be im o be im o be im o be imp p p p pr r r r ro o o o ov v v v ved t ed t ed t ed t ed to e o e o e o e o enh nh nh nh nhan an an an ance t ce t ce t ce t ce th h h h he e e e e
be be be be ben n n n ne e e e ef f f f fits o its o its o its o its of gr f gr f gr f gr f gro o o o owt wt wt wt wth t h t h t h t h to t o t o t o t o th h h h he poo e poo e poo e poo e poor r r r r. . . . .